One of the first policy decisions in this new war concerned the Geneva Conventions – four 1949 treaties ratified by the United States that codify many of the rules for war. But Al-Qaida, without regular armed forces, territory or citizens to defend, also presents unprecedented military challenges. Responding to the attacks and protecting the United States from another requires a military approach to the conflict. The attacks were more than crimes – they were acts of war. 11, 2001, proved that the war against Al-Qaida cannot be won solely within the framework of the criminal law.

I can explain why the administration decided that aggressive measures, though sometimes unpopular, are necessary to protect America from another terrorist attack. He will encounter questions about the decision to deny prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions to Al-Qaida and Taliban fighters and about his role in what have come to be known as 'torture memos.'' As a Justice Department lawyer, I dealt with both issues – I worked on and signed the department's memo on the Geneva Conventions and helped draft the main memo defining torture. He demonstrated leadership and, as is often the case in perilous times, generated controversy. It comes as no surprise that he is likely to face hard questions.Īs counsel to the president for the past four years, Gonzales helped develop the United States' policies in the war on terror. This week, the Senate Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on the nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be attorney general. Punishment, but to indifference - meaning ' WeĪre All Torturers Now,' writes journalism The idea that an attorney's job is, in all circumstances, to help his client get as much as he can without clearly violating the law is simplistic and wrong.Entering a new period in its history, when government Yoo essentially exploited the prestige of his office to expand the law and expand executive authority in a way that would not have been permitted had it not been sub rosa. The tortue memo was, most importantly, a memo. The way it was described to me (by a former OLC member and law prof, before this torture business blew up), is that the OLC can basically write 'get out jail free' cards for administration officials, so they're expected to be very careful and conservative in their interpretation of executive authority.

These guys are smart and know what they're talking about. The OLC's opinions aren't taken lightly by federal courts, mainly because it's the most pretigious office a carreer public servant attorney could ask for. Counsel's advice, if misguided, can exonerate the employer, or the employer's agents. The analogy even goes to the weight courts grant in-house (or even retained, in some circumstances) counsel. Counsel's main job is to help his employer comply with the law, not avoid it. I'm uncomfortable labeling Yoo a war criminal, but the OLC's relationship to the White House (and by extension, to other agencies) is more like the relationship in-house general counsel has to his employer than a normal attorney-client relationship in litigation.

Torture memoranda